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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Gerald A. Barcella appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing some of the claims contained in his for post-conviction petition relief 
and from the district court's order dismissing the remaining claims after an 
evidentiary hearing. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
The factual background and course of the criminal proceedings are set 
forth by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 16 P.3d 
288 (Ct. App. 2000) (review denied): 
The state's evidence at trial set forth the following fact 
scenario: On the evening of April 2, 1995, Barcella told Kenneth 
Thrift-his drinking buddy for the evening, Virginia Smeltzer-the 
bartender at the Watering Hole bar in Coeur d'Alene, and Brad 
Bakie that he intended to kill Smith, the elderly manager of the 
Harmony House apartments where Barcella resided. 
Returning to Barcella's room at the Harmony House 
apartments after the Watering Hole closed, Barcella and Thrift 
noisily entered the building and went into Barcella's one-room 
apartment, across the hall from Smith's room. There, they 
continued to drink accompanied by the noise of the radio and 
television. Smith, through the door, told Barcella to turn the volume 
down. Barcella begrudgingly complied. Some time later, while Thrift 
returned to his room next door to get some cigarettes and more 
beer, Barcella entered Smith's room and bludgeoned him in the 
head with a pulaski. When Thrift came back, about five minutes 
later, Barcella was at Smith's door, across the hall, wiping off the 
doorknob with his bandana. 
Back in Barcella's room, Barcella told Thrift that he had killed 
Smith. The two continued drinking beer until about 4:30 a.m. and 
then left to get breakfast at Denny's Restaurant. From there, 
Barcella called his girlfriend Rikki Bobo. He told her to get over to 
Denny's and that he had killed Smith. Once she arrived, Barcella 
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again told Bobo and Thrift that he killed Smith by striking him in the 
head three times with a pick ax. 
After visiting with Barcena and Thrift at Denny's for nearly an 
hour, Bobo returned to Barcella's room at Harmony House. There, 
she noticed that Barcella's pulaski was not in his room. When 
Barcella arrived, Bobo, with Barcella's approval, wrote out a note 
addressed to Smith requesting a receipt for Barcella's rent 
payment. Barcena told her that the note was a good idea because it 
would make the police believe that Barcena thought Smith was still 
alive. Bobo slipped the note under Smith's door. 
Later that afternoon, Peter Cooper, the owner of the 
Harmony House apartments, discovered Smith's body. Smith had 
several large head wounds and smaller wounds in his chest. A 
pulaski was found under a piece of carpet stuffed under Smith's 
bed. During the homicide investigation, officers discovered that 
Barcena, a convicted felon, possessed firearms in his room. While 
in jail on a charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 
Barcena was charged with first degree murder for the killing of 
Smith, 1.C. §§ 18-4001-18-4003. 
At the preliminary hearing, Robert Agrifolio, a convicted 
defendant in an unrelated burglary case, testified that in September 
of 1995 he occupied a jail cell adjacent to Barcella's cell in the 
Latah County Jail. After identifying Barcena, Agrifolio testified that, 
while in the jail's recreation yard, Barcella told him he hit Smith in 
the head with an ax because he believed Smith had killed his 
puppy. Agrifolio was cross-examined extensively about his prior 
convictions, his conversations with Barcena, and his reason for 
testifying. Agrifolio testified that he was under subpoena and 
denied being a jailhouse snitch or getting any benefit from testifying 
against Barcena. 
Barcella was bound over to district court for trial on the 
charge of murder in the first degree. At trial, the state called twenty-
two witnesses including investigating officers, medical experts, the 
Watering Hole bartender, the apartment owner, several apartment 
residents, Bobo, Thrift and two jailhouse informants-Agrifolio and 
George Lane. 
Before calling Thrift, the state attempted to preclude 
impeachment through Thrift's prior criminal convictions. In part, 
Barcella sought to impeach Thrift by introducing evidence of his 
criminal history, arguing that Thrift is per se untruthful because 
honest people do not get arrested ninety-four times, forty-two of 
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which were for felonies. The trial court ruled that Thrift's only felony 
convictions in the last ten years were two DUls, not crimes relevant 
to truth and veracity under I.R.E. 609. Thrift testified that Barcella 
owned a pulaski when he moved into the Harmony House 
apartments, that Barcella had several times threatened to kill 
Smith, and that he had seen Barcella wiping off Smith's doorknob 
with a bandana when Thrift came out of his room with more beer. 
Thrift also stated that Barcella admitted to killing Smith once he and 
Thrift returned to Barcella's room to drink more beer and, again, 
after he and Thrift arrived at Denny's Restaurant for breakfast early 
the next morning. 
Bobo also testified that Barcella owned a pulaski when he 
moved into the Harmony House apartments. She further testified to 
Barcella's admissions to killing Smith and acknowledged that she 
had written a note about rent payment that was slipped under 
Smith's door to prevent police attention from focusing on Barcella. 
After challenging Bobo's credibility by questioning her about a plea 
deal on a recent DUI charge and the state's grant of immunity 
regarding her writing the rent payment note, Barcella also sought to 
inquire about her status as a jail inmate and why she was allowed 
to testify in civilian clothing and makeup. The court sustained the 
state's objection to this line of inquiry. 
The state then attempted to call Agrifolio as its next witness; 
however, the bailiff reported that Agrifolio had told the jailers that 
he refused to testify. Agrifolio was brought into court from the jail 
and questioned. After he indicated that he did not want to testify, 
the court appointed counsel for Agrifolio so that he could obtain 
legal advice before finally deciding whether or not to testify. A day 
later, Agrifolio's counsel informed the court that Agrifolio would not 
testify. The district court determined that Agrifolio was unavailable. 
Four days later, the court, over Barcella's objection, permitted 
Agrifolio's preliminary hearing testimony to be read into the record. 
The state's twentieth witness, Lane, also a jailhouse witness, 
testified that Barcella had admitted to killing his apartment manager 
by hitting him in the back of the head because the manager was 
nagging him about making too much noise. Lane testified that 
Barcella said a witness, his drinking buddy, had seen him come out 
of the manager's apartment on the night of the murder. Lane 
testified that Barcella was not worried about being prosecuted 
because in the past he had shot a couple of people and was never 
convicted. Barcella immediately objected and moved for a mistrial 
on the grounds that the state has elicited testimony about prior bad 
acts in violation of I.R.E. 404. The district court denied the motion 
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for a mistrial and instructed the jury to disregard Lane's last 
statement. 
Barcella also sought a mistrial on the ground that the state 
made a late disclosure of the first twenty-seven pages of the 
transcript of Bobo's statement to the police. The court denied the 
motion, suggesting Barcella could avoid any prejudice caused by 
late disclosure by recalling Bobo as a witness. Barcella declined to 
do so. 
The trial court denied Barcella's motion for a judgment of 
acquittal made at the close of the state's case. During Barcella's 
case-in-chief, Barcella did not testify. After presenting several 
character witnesses in defense, Barcella sought to introduce 
testimony from Kootenai County Public Defender's Office 
Investigator Mark Durant. Durant was to testify that Agrifolio had 
recently made several unsolicited telephone calls to him, stating 
that he-Agrifolio-had been pressured into testifying at the 
preliminary hearing and, that when asked if his preliminary hearing 
testimony had been truthful, Agrifolio had said he would "take the 
Fifth Amendment on that." The state objected and the court, 
without explanation, disallowed Durant's testimony. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty to first degree murder 
and found that Barcella had used a deadly weapon in the 
commission of the murder. Barcella filed a motion for new trial re-
raising the issues he had raised at trial-Lane's blurt about Barcella 
having shot two people in the past and gotten away with it, the late 
disclosure of the first twenty-seven pages of Bobo's statement to 
the police, the admission of Agrifolio's preliminary hearing 
testimony, the trial court's preclusion of Durant's impeachment of 
Agrifolio's preliminary hearing testimony, and the court's refusal to 
allow Barcella to inquire into Thrift's record of prior arrests to 
impeach him for lack of truthfulness. The district court denied 
Barcella's motion for a new trial, explaining that Barcella had failed 
to demonstrate prejudice from the state's late disclosure of a 
portion of Bobo's statement to the police and that Lane's "couple of 
shootings" blurt had been dealt with by instructing the jury to 
disregard that statement. The court also ruled that Agrifolio's 
purported refusal to testify made him unavailable, allowing his 
preliminary hearing testimony to be read into the record, that I.R.E. 
609 did not permit Barcella to impeach Thrift with his prior arrests, 
and that Barcella had made no offer of proof regarding 
impeachment of Agrifolio's preliminary hearing testimony. 
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The state filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, 
and a hearing was held on aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. The district court found that the state had failed to 
prove the existence of any statutory aggravating circumstance 
beyond a reasonable doubt and thus the death penalty could not 
be imposed. At sentencing, the district court imposed a term of life 
imprisonment, with thirty years fixed. The court denied Barcella's 
I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of the sentence. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed Barcella's conviction and sentence. Barcella, 135 
Idaho at 205, 16 P.3d at 302. 
Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Barcella filed a timely prose petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.1-
326.) 1 In his petition, Barcella listed twenty-nine "Grounds for ... application for 
post-conviction relief': 
1) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
2) Prosecutorial Misconduct 
3) Access to Courts Violated 
4) Due Process Rights Violated 
5) Judge Haman's pretrial decisions violated petitioner's rights 
6) Judge Bengston's decisions and conduct at trial violated 
petitioner's rights. 
7) Trial judge should have granted a new trial 
8) Cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors 
9) Cumulative effect of judge's wrongful decisions and conduct 
10) Cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct. 
11) Cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors, pretrial and trial 
judges wrongful decisions and conduct and prosecutorial 
misconduct 
12) Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
13) The jury used information not in evidence to convict 
petitioner 
14) Petitioner's 5th Amendment rights against self-incrimination 
were violated 
15) Judge's decisions at trial were unjust and manifestly 
inconsistent 
1 (Pages four through thirty-nine are the table of contents and documents relating to his 
















8th Amendment rights violated by an unfair process 
The jury was improperly selected 
Jury Instructions on Murder I and Murder II were improper 
The jury pool was improperly selected 
The jury relied on false and perjured testimony to convict 
petitioner 
The appellate court should have overturned petitioner's 
conviction and ordered a new trial or petitioner's immediate 
release 
Petitioner's right to confront and examine witnesses was 
denied repeatedly 
The jury pool had the potential of being contaminated by a 
perspective ~sic] juror's comments. 
Barcella's 6t Amendment rights to confront witnesses were 
denied · 
Barcella's 14th Amendment rights to due process were 
violated 
Barcella's access to courts rights were violated 
Combination of all errors included in this petition along with 2 
reversible errors acknowledged in appeal response and 
other reasons sighted [sic] in appeal denied Barcella a fair 
trial 
New evidence not disclosed at trial. 
Mr. Barcella's trial was unfair. 
(R., pp.40-45.) Barcella's petition included a request for counsel, which was 
granted by the district court. (R., pp.2, 584-588.) Barcella also filed an "Affidavit 
of Gerald A. Barcella." (R., pp.330-332.) Apparently filed simultaneously with 
the affidavit, or possibly attached to the affidavit (although the affidavit itself does 
not refer to any attachments) are more than two hundred pages of documents, 
including jail kites and hand-written notes apparently written by Barcella, copies 
of transcripts, reports and letters prepared by other individuals (R., pp.333-579). 
The state filed an answer to Barcella's petition (R., pp.591-592), and 
moved for summary disposition (R., pp.594-595). The basis for the state's 
motion was Barcella had "provided no affidavit, record or other evidence 
supporting his general allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel" and 
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provided reference to State v. Nielsen, 121 Idaho 779, 828 P.2d 342 (Ct. App. 
1992) for the proposition that a petition may be dismissed for lack of "affidavits, 
documents or other evidence [thereby] not having presented a genuine issue of 
material fact." (R., p.594.) The state further asserted that Barcella had failed to 
provide "affidavits, documents or other evidence to supports hit allegation that 
there exists evidence of material facts not previously presented and heard that 
requires vacation of the conviction and sentence." (R., pp.594-595.) 
Barcella's counsel filed an amended petition for post conviction relief. (R., 
pp.757-761.) Barcella's counsel listed, as grounds for relief: 
a. That the judgment and sentence is in violation of the 
Constitution of the United States and the State of Idaho. 
b. Prosecutorial misconduct which resulted in a violation of due 
process. 
c. That the conviction is subject to collateral attack on the 
grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
d. That the affirmation of the conviction by the Supreme Court 
is subject to collateral attack on the grounds of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel. 
(R., pp.758-759.) Counsel further specifically referenced and incorporated 
Barcella's "290 page pro se Petition" (R., p.759, paragraph 9) but did not 
reference or incorporate Barcella's affidavit or the 246 pages of documents 
apparently attached to that affidavit. Counsel did assure the court that "[f]urther 
supporting material in the way of affidavits, transcripts, etc. will be filed in 
supplement to this Petition as they are gathered." (R., p.759.) 
The state filed an answer to the amended petition (R., pp.762-763) and an 
amended motion for summary disposition (R., pp.764-765). The state pointed 
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out that Barcella's claim that his judgment and sentence are unconstitutional was 
an issue that "barred and forfeited on post-conviction" because it could and 
should have been raised on direct appeal. (R., p.764.) Likewise, Barcella's 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct appeared to also be an issue that could and 
should have been raise on direct appeal, citing Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 
932 P.2d 348 (1997) and Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421, 745 P.2d 300 (Ct. 
App. 1987). (R., p.764.) The state attached a copy of the Court of Appeals' 
opinion in Barcella's direct appeal. (R., p.765.) Finally, the state based its 
motion on the fact that Barcella had "provided no affidavit, record or other 
evidence supporting his conclusory allegations that trial counsel and appellate 
counsel were ineffective", citing Nellsch v. State, 121 Idaho 779, 828 P.2d 342 
(Ct. App. 1992) "for the proposition that claims alleged by a petitioner which are 
not supported by affidavits, documents or other evidence may be dismissed at 
summary judgment for not having presented a material issue of fact." (R., 
p.765.) 
At the hearing on the state's motion for summary disposition, the state 
again iterated what it believed to be the issues raised by Barcella's petition and 
amended petition: "unconstitutional judgment and sentence" (1/9/07 Tr., p.6, 
Ls.18-21), "prosecutorial misconduct" (1/9/07 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-4), and "ineffective 
assistance of counsel" (1/9/07 Tr., p.7, Ls.19-23). The state reiterated the bases 
for its motion to dismiss - that the first two issues should have been raised on 
direct appeal and that Barcella had not asserted facts that would support his 
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claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: "there's just an absence in the record 
of facts by way of affidavit." (1/9/07 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.8, L.25.) 
In response, Barcella's counsel did not disagree with the state's 
characterization of Barcella's petition having presented three claims. Instead, 
counsel appeared to concede the state's point with regard to the first two issues 
by attempting to instead preserve the first two claims as claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. (1/9/07 Tr., p.9, L. 14 - p.11, L.8) Counsel then asked 
the court to "allow this record to remain open" so that he could submit affidavits 
in support of Barcella's claims - as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel -
within 30 days. (1/9/07 Tr., p.11, Ls.9-19, p.14, L.23 - 15, L.9.) 
The district court likewise viewed Barcella's petition, without objection 
from Barcella, as having presented the three issues as articulated by the state, 
expanded to four by Barcella's own petition breaking down the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim into trial counsel and appellate counsel claims. 
(1/9/07 Tr., p.15, L.10 - p.20, L.6.) The court summarily dismissed Barcella's 
first and second claims, and granted him an evidentiary hearing with regard to 
claims three and four - ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. (R., 
p.771; 1/9/07 Tr., p.15, L.10-p.20, L.6.) 
After an evidentiary hearing on the claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel (5/29/07 transcript and 5/30/07 transcript), and following briefing by the 
parties (R., pp.778-819), the district court dismissed the remainder of Barcella's 
petition. (R., pp.820-833.) Barcella timely appealed. (R., pp.840-843.) 
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ISSUES 
Barcella states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Given the vagueness of the state's motion for summary 
dismissal, did the District Court err in summarily dismissing 
all issues except ineffective assistance of trial and appellate 
counsel without giving 20 days notice of the reasons 
therefore as required by I.C. § 19-4906(b)? 
2. Even if the state's notice had been proper and the Court had 
been correct that Gerry raised only four issues and not 
twenty-nine, did the District Court err in summarily 
dismissing the claims of an unconstitutional judgment and 
sentence and prosecutorial misconduct as the issues could 
not have been raised on direct appeal as proof of the claims 
required presentation of evidence outside the appellate 
record? 
3. Did the District Court err in finding that trial counsel's error in 
prohibiting Gerry from testifying in his own defense was not 
prejudicial given that with Gerry's testimony there was a 
reasonable probability that the jury would have found Gerry 
guilty of manslaughter, but not first degree murder, as his 
testimony established that he could not have formed the 
requisite intent for first degree murder? 
(Appellant's brief, p.15.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Barcella failed to preserve his claim that the state's notice was 
insufficient because he failed to object below? 
2. Has Barcella failed to establish error in the district court's dismissal of his 
claims of unconstitutional judgment and sentence and prosecutorial 
misconduct? 
3. Has Barcella failed to establish the district court erred when it analyzed his 
claim that trial counsel did not allow him to testify as an ineffective 




Barcella's Claim That The State's Motions For Summary Dismissal And 
Memoranda In Support Did Not Give Him Sufficient Notice May Not Be Raised 
For The First Time On Appeal 
A. Introduction 
Barcella claims that the state's motions for summary disposition were 
"vague" (Appellant's brief, p.15), did not "refer to specific allegations in the 
petition on a claim-by-claim basis [or] specifically refer to deficiencies in the 
evidence or additional legal analysis necessary to avoid summary dismissal of 
the claim" (Appellant's brief, p.18). Barcella's Appellant's brief casts his claim as 
a claim of insufficient notice by the state. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-19.) As such, 
they may not be raised for the first time on appeal, because Barcella did not 
object to the sufficiency of the notice below. 
B. The Notice Requirements of I.C. § 19-4906 
An applicant for post-conviction relief is required to make a prima facie 
case by presenting admissible evidence on each element of his or her claims. 
Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998). Idaho Code 
§ 19-4906(c) permits either party in a post-conviction relief proceeding to file a 
motion for summary disposition of the application. The trial court can grant the 
motion when "it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any 
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." !si, 
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Because a post-conviction relief proceeding is governed by the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, see Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 813, 907 P.2d 783, 
790 (1995); I.C. § 19-4907(a), a motion for summary disposition must "state with 
particularity the grounds therefor." Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,322, 
900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995); I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1). The particularity requirement of Rule 
7(b)(1), however, "only requires reasonable particularity." DeRushe v. State, 146 
Idaho 599, ---, 200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009) (citing Patton v. Patton, 88 Idaho 
288, 292, 399 P.2d 262, 264-65 (1965)). "If the notice is sufficient that the other 
party cannot assert surprise or prejudice, the requirement is met." kl 
Furthermore, "[i]f the ground for summary disposition is that there is no 
admissible evidence on an essential element of a claim, reasonable particularity 
only requires pointing that out." kl Stated differently, if the basis for dismissal 
is lack of evidence produced by the petitioner, the motion need only state as 
much. 
When a district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction application 
relying in part on the same arguments presented by the state in its motion for 
summary dismissal, the notice requirement has been met. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 525, 164 P.3d 798, 805 (2007). 
If the petitioner's claim on appeal from summary dismissal is lack of 
particularity - that the "State did not state the grounds of its motion with sufficient 
particularity" - it is a claim that the petitioner must raise below. DeRushe at ---, 
200 P.3d at 1151. A post-conviction petitioner "cannot raise the alleged lack of 
specificity for the first time on appeal." kl (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 
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799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); McCoy v. State, 129 Idaho 70, 921 P.2d 1194 
(1996)). 
Barcella did not raise below his new claim on appeal that the state's 
notice was "vague" or did not "refer to specific allegations in the petition on a 
claim-by-claim basis [or] specifically refer to deficiencies in the evidence or 
additional legal analysis necessary to avoid summary dismissal of the claim." 
Despite his attempts in his supplemental briefing, in light of the holding in 
DeRushe, to recast his claim as one of no notice, his claim on appeal is that the 
state's notice was insufficient. See State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763, 
864 P.2d 596 (1993) ("This Court has held that it will not consider an issue if it 
was not raised as an issue on appeal."). As such, is it should not be considered 
as having been raised for the first time on appeal. 
11. 
The Claims Of Unconstitutional Judgment And Sentence And Prosecutorial 
Misconduct Were Properly Summarily Dismissed 
A. Introduction 
Barcella contends that his claims that his judgment and sentence were 
unconstitutional and that the prosecution engaged in misconduct should not 
have been summarily dismissed, because, he claims, these claims could not 
have been raised on direct appeal because they were "based upon allegations 
outside of the record on appeal." (Appellant's brief, p.21.) Barcella's claim on 
appeal is based not on these claims' viability as claims related to the ineffective 
assistance of counsel but as stand-alone claims requiring extrinsic evidence in 
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support. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-22.) Below, Barcella waived any objection to 
the dismissal of these claims except as they related to his claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Further, Barcella has failed to establish any error by the 
district court in the dismissal of these claims because they are issues that should 
have been raised on direct appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the dismissal of a post-conviction application, the appellate 
court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists 
which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted. Nellsch 
v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The court 
freely reviews the district court's application of the law. Id. at 434, 835 P.2d at 
669. 
C. Barcella Has Waived Any Objection To The Dismissal Of These Claims 
Except As They Are Related To His Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel 
At the hearing on the state's motion for summary disposition, the state 
opened with the state reiterated the bases for its motion to dismiss - that the first 
two issues should have been raised on direct appeal. (1/9/07 Tr., p.6, L.22 -
p.7, L.18.) 
Barcella's counsel concede the state's point with regard to the first two 
issues by attempting to instead preserve the first two claims as claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. (1/9/07 Tr., p.9, L.14 - p.11, L.8) Counsel 
then asked the court to "allow this record to remain open" so that he could 
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submit affidavits in support of all of Barcella's claims - as claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel - within 30 days. (1/9/07 Tr., p.11, ls.9-19, p.14, L.23 -
15, L.9.) 
A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or 
advantage. Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 26, 936 P.2d 219, 224 (Ct. App. 
1997). Waiver will not be inferred; the intent to waive must clearly appear on the 
record. Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky. 123 Idaho 253, 256, 846 P.2d 904, 
907 (1993). Ordinarily, a client is bound by his attorney's actions. State v. 
LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 391, 630 P.2d 674, 678 (1981). Because post-
conviction proceedings are civil in nature, State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 
678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983), and a court is entitled to accept counsel's 
express waiver of a claim in a civil case, see, e.g., Jung v. Mundy. Holt & Mance. 
P.C., 372 F.3d 429, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2004), an express waiver of post-conviction 
claims by counsel is valid. Barcella's counsel waived objection to the dismissal 
of his first two claims, except as they might relate to his overall claims of 
ineffective assistance of cousnel. 
D. These Claims Must Have Been Raised As Part Of Barcella's Direct 
Appeal 
A post-conviction petition is not a substitute for a direct appeal, and, as 
such "any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is 
forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings .... " I.C. § 
19-4901(b). Because these claims could have been brought on direct appeal, 
but were not, they were waived and cannot be considered in post-conviction 
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proceedings. See Hoffman v. State, 125 Idaho 188, 190-91, 868 P.2d 516, 518-
19 (Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to consider issues that should have been raised on 
direct appeal). Barcella still has not identified what claims fall under the umbrella 
of "unconstitutional judgment and sentence" or "prosecutorial misconduct" that 
could not have been raised on direct appeal. The district court correctly applied 
the law in summarily dismissing Barcella's claims of unconstitutional judgment 
and sentence and prosecutorial misconduct based upon his failure to raise the 
claims on direct appeal. 
111. 
Barcella's Claim That His Counsel Was Ineffective For Allegedly Prohibiting Him 
From Testifying At Trial Was Properly Dismissed After An Evidentiary Hearing 
A. Introduction 
Barcella claims, in his supplemental brief, that the district court improperly 
considered his claim that his trial counsel prevented him from testifying as a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Supplemental Brief of Appellant, 
pp.3-5.) Under the doctrine of invited error, however, Barcella is estopped from 
complaining of the district court's ruling. 
B. The Doctrine Of Invited Error Precludes Barcella From Raising Any 
Objection To The District Court's Treatment Of This Claim 
With respect to Barcella's argument, raised for the first time in his 
supplemental briefing, that the district court improperly considered his claim that 
counsel did not allow him to testify as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
he is precluded from raising such an argument for the first time on appeal. As 
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evidenced by Barcella's petition, his argument at the hearing on summary 
dismissal, his argument and presentation of evidence at the evidentiary hearing, 
and his argument in his Appellant's brief, pp. 22-26, Barcella has consistently 
framed this claim as a question of ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, any 
error in the district court's consideration of this claim was invited and cannot be 
considered on appeal. A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, 
from complaining that a ruling or action of the trial court that the party invited, 
consented to, or acquiesced in was error. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 
3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000). The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to 
prevent a party who "caused or played an important role in prompting a trial 
court" to take a particular action from "later challenging that decision on appeal." 
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999). Moreover, the 
failure to raise an issue before the trial court waives that issue for the purposes 
of appeal. State v. Lenon, 143 Idaho 415, 417-18, 146 P.3d 681, 683-84 (Ct. 
App. 2006). In his petition, amended petition and brief in support of his petition, 
Barcella framed this issue in precisely the way district court considered it (and in 
precisely the way that he framed it in his initial brief on appeal). He can not now 




The state respectfully asks this Court to affirm the dismissal of Barcella's 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 24th day of June, 2009. -~ 
Rebekah A. Cude 
Deputy Attorney General 
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